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Where full static analysis of systems fails to scale up due to system size, dynamic monitoring has
been increasingly used to ensure system correctness. The downside is, however, runtime overheads
which are induced by the additional monitoring code instrumented. To address this issue, various
approaches have been proposed in the literature to use static analysis in order to reduce monitoring
overhead. In this paper we generalise existing work which uses control-flow static analysis to opti-
mise properties specified as automata, and prove how similar analysis can be applied to more expres-
sive symbolic automata - enabling reduction of monitoring instrumentation in the system, and also
monitoring logic. We also present empirical evidence of the effectiveness of this approach through
an analysis of the effect of monitoring overheads in a financial transaction system.
1 Introduction
The need for verification of a system to be able to make some guarantees about execution paths, and
going beyond sampling of such paths (as done in testing), is required for critical or sensitive software
(e.g. financial software [8]). The literature can be largely split into two main approaches: (i) full a
priori verification of all possible execution paths through model checking, static analysis and similar
techniques, and (ii) on-the-fly verification of execution paths to ensure that any potential violation can be
immediately truncated as in runtime verification.
The former approaches tend not to scale to more complex and large software, which is typically
addressed by abstraction techniques, e.g. verifying the property against an over-approximation of the
program (if the over-approximation cannot violate the property, then the program cannot either), due to
which the analysis is no longer complete. These approaches readily scale up to handle larger systems, and
have the additional advantage that they can also deal with constraints on the environment which can only
be verified fully at runtime (e.g. two methods of an API are never called in sequence by an unknown client
application). The downside is, however, that the additional checks introduced typically add significant
runtime overheads [17]. Traditionally, these two approaches have been seen as alternatives to each other,
although their possible complementarity has started to be explored in recent years [3, 11, 13].
Approaches exist that use static analysis to prove parts of a property with respect to a program, such
that either the whole property is proved statically or it is pruned such that there is less to monitor at
runtime, or vice-versa so that certain parts of the program are proved safe to not monitor. We call this
residual analysis, with the pruned property called a residual. In language-theoretic terms, the language of
a residual intersected with that of a program is equal to the language of the original property intersected
with the program. This paper deals with the creation of such residuals in the presence of properties
parametrised over different objects with different behaviour.
∗This research has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
grant number 666363.
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In particular, Clara [11] is one such approach, acting on purely control-flow properties (without
any consideration for data state) defined as automata with transitions triggered by method calls in Java
programs. Through an analysis of the source code, Clara can be used to determine whether a property
transition can never be taken by the program and whether parts of a program can be safely unmonitored.
The approach uses three analysis steps, each equivalent to a comparison of the property automaton with
a finer over-approximation of the control-flow of a program. However, in practice, one frequently desires
properties which are more expressive than these simple automata (e.g. one may want to talk about the
value of a transaction after some sequence of events).
DATEs (Dynamic Automata with Events and Timers) [12] involve symbolic automata possibly run-
ning in parallel, with transitions triggered by either a method invocation or a timer event, and conditioned
on a boolean expression on variables specific to the monitor and the program. Moreover, when triggered,
a transition can also perform an action which may also affect the triggering of other transitions (e.g.
increase some internal counter used by another transition’s condition). In this paper, we do not handle
timers and the dynamic creation of DATEs, and focus on extending Clara to automata with transitions
guarded by conditions and actions as an initial step towards handling full DATEs. Even with this lim-
itation, applying Clara directly to DATEs proves to be unsound, as we shall discuss informally, given
transitions with side-effects may be removed (possibly changing the verdict of the reduced property).
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold: (i) extending the intuition behind Clara’s first two analyses
to produce both a residual DATE and a residual instrumentation of the program, and (ii) a novel analysis
that uses a control-flow graph of a program to determine if any transitions in a DATE can (or can not)
be reached by the program. In a case study, we show that each of these analyses can produce significant
reduction in runtime overheads (down to 4% from an average of 97% of the original unmonitored run
time), we also explain in which cases such results can be expected. Full proofs of the results presented
in this paper can be found in [7].
In presenting our results, we first detail some formal preliminaries, using simple automata with events
in Section 2 and use these to discuss Clara’s analyses, while in Section 3 we present DATEs and define
residuals over them, which we evaluate in Section 4. We discuss related work in Section 5, and conclude
proposing future work in Section 6. Due to space restrictions, the proofs of the results presented in this
paper are not included. However, they are available in a technical report available online [7].
2 Programs’ Runtime Traces and Abstractions
In this section we look at safety properties over the control-flow of a program, written in the form of
automata with transitions being triggered by the program1. We will build on this formalism in the rest of
the paper.
Definition 2.1 (Property automata). A property automaton pi is a tuple 〈Q,Σ,q0,B,δ 〉, where Q is a finite
set of states, Σ is a set of events, q0 is the initial state (q0 ∈ Q), B is the set of bad states (B ⊆ Q), and δ
is the transition relation (δ ⊆Q×Σ×Q), which is deterministic and total with respect to Q×Σ.
We write q
e
−→pi q
′ for (q,e,q′)∈ δ , q
es
=⇒pi q
′ for the transitive closure of δ (with es∈ Σ∗), and q →֒pi q
′
to denote that q′ is reachable from q (i.e. ∃es ·q0
es
=⇒pi q
′). We leave out pi if it is clear from the context.
Finally, we will write pi ↾ Σ′ to denote the property automaton identical to pi except that the alphabet
is restricted to Σ′: Σpi↾Σ′
def
= Σ′ and δpi↾Σ′
def
= {(q,e,q′) ∈ δpi | e ∈ Σ
′}); and pi ↾ δ ′ as pi with the transition
relation restricted to δ ′: δpi↾δ ′
def
= δpi ∩δ
′.
1It is worth noting, that although we will allow for branching on data values in our formalism, we do not trigger transitions
over changes in data values, hence our characterisation of these properties as being over the control-flow of the program.
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Figure 1: Property disallowing writing on a closed stream, and writing or closing while in the middle of an odd
number of reads.
Consider that in monitoring we are concerned with points of interest during the execution of the pro-
gram (e.g. when a method is called), which correspond to particular statements or regions in a program’s
source code. We use these corresponding program statements to trigger events at runtime to enable
monitoring — and calling them event generators, since they generate property events. The problem of
verification is then, given a property automaton and a program, to ensure that all program traces gener-
ated do not transition into a bad property state [16]. We call t ∈ Σ∗ a ground trace, while we denote the
set of events appearing in t by Σ(t)
def
= {e | ∃i ∈ N · t(i) = e}, overloaded to sets of ground traces T ⊆ Σ∗.
Definition 2.2 (Property satisfaction). A ground trace t ∈ Σ∗ is said to satisfy property automaton pi if
no prefix of t leads to a bad state from the initial state: t ⊢ pi
def
= ∀t ′ ∈ prefixes(t) ·∄qB ∈ B ·q0
t ′
=⇒ qB. We
overload this notation to sets of ground traces T ⊢ pi to indicate that all traces in T satisfy pi .
Consider as an example the property automaton shown in Figure 1, which specifies that the write
method cannot be called before open is called, and that the read method is called in pairs2. Bad states are
marked in red, while an asterisk (*) on a transition is syntactic sugar used to denote that if at that state an
event happens for which no other transition matches, then the asterisk transition is taken.
In practice, one would want to instantiate a property automaton for every instance of the object being
verified. For example, the property automaton shown in Figure 1 should ideally be monitoring for every
stream in use. To enable such replication of property automata, we extend them to parametric properties
[14] (or typestate automata [11]). To generalise property automata to handle parametrisation, we start by
extending traces to parametrised traces in which each event is associated with an identifier of the object3
to which the event pertains. Note that we allow an alphabet to be parametrised by a set of identifiers α
with: Σα
def
= α ×Σ. Traces over such alphabets will be referred to as parametrised traces.
A trace contains events possibly related to different objects. To consider satisfaction of a property by
one object we project the trace onto that object (assuming an equivalence relation between the objects).
Definition 2.3 (Parametrised traces). The projection of a parametrised trace rt ∈ Σ∗α with respect to an
identifier x ∈ α and an equivalence relation between objects ≡ ∈ α ↔ α , written rt ↓ x, is defined to be
the sequence of items in rt with identifiers equivalent to x, as follows 4:
〈〉 ↓ x
def
= 〈〉
((x′,p) : rt) ↓ x
def
=
{
(x′,p) : (rt ↓ x) if x≡ x′
rt ↓ x otherwise
2Note that in this example there are outgoing transitions from bad states, although any trace that goes through a bad state is
judged as violating. Clara’s and our semantics allow this, since we may want to count the number of violations, or in the case
of DATEs transitions may actually repair the violation (although we would still want to note it).
3Although we will be using the term ‘object’ in this paper, events can be parametrised with respect to an identity other than
the object on which the method is invoked.
4We use the standard notation x : xs to denote the list with head x and tail xs.
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A parametrised trace rt ∈ Σ∗ is said to satisfy a property automaton pi , written rt  pi , if for each
identifier x ∈ α , the projection of rt onto x satisfies the property: rt  pi
def
= ∀x ∈ α · rt ↓ x ⊢ pi .
At runtime, we have perfect knowledge of the equivalence relation between parametrised events.
However, when using static analysis, this is not always possible. In the case of parametrisation by
objects, several variable alias analyses exist, that can give partial information on whether two source
code variables can point to the same runtime object (we use [10]). In such cases, we have three possible
outcomes: (i) the two variables always refer to the same object; (ii) the two variables always refer to
different objects; and (iii) neither of the previous two cases can be concluded. In the literature, this
information is typically encapsulated in two relations — a must relation ≡, which relates two event
generators (e.g. method calls) if their objects always (must) match, and a may relation ≡may, which
relates two event generators if their objects may match, with the former relation being a subset of the
latter 5. Thus, with such variables as static object identifiers, when statically we are given a trace of event-
identifier couples, we can extract the possible runtime traces generated by these, through projection
on certain identifiers. This is in contrast to parametrised traces where the behaviour of each object is
perfectly known and thus only one ground trace is generated through projection.
Definition 2.4 (Static Parametrised Traces). A static parametrised trace is a parametrised trace st ∈ Σ∗α ,
with two relations over α : (i) a must-alias equivalence relation ≡ ∈ α ↔ α , and (ii) a may-alias relation
≡may ∈α ↔α , such that≡ ⊆≡may. We define the projection of a static parametrised trace st with respect
to parameter x, written st ⇓ x, as follows:
〈〉 ⇓ x
def
= {〈〉}
((x′,e) : st) ⇓ x
def
=


{e : es | es ∈ st ⇓ x} if x≡ x′
st ⇓ x if x 6≡may x
′
st ⇓ x∪{e : es | es ∈ st ⇓ x} otherwise
We overload this notation over sets of static parametrised traces: ST ⇓ x
def
=
⋃
st∈ST st ⇓ x; and over sets
of identifiers: ST ⇓ X
def
=
⋃
x∈X ST ⇓ x.
Trace st is said to satisfy property automaton pi , written st  pi , if for each identifier x ∈ α the
projection of st onto x satisfies the property: st pi
def
= ∀x ∈ α · st ⇓ x ⊢ pi .
It is worth noting that although we are only considering parametrisation over a single identifier (e.g.
to an object), a property can be parametrized over multiple objects. The work presented here applies to
that case, by abstracting tuples of identifiers into a single identifier, with point-wise must and may-alias
relations.
We now turn our view from individual traces to the programs which generate them.
Definition 2.5 (Programs). For a program P over an alphabet Σ with a set of runtime objects Obj and
static object identifiers ObjId, (i) we will write PR
Σ
to denote the set of parametrised traces over Obj i.e.
PR
Σ
⊆ Σ∗Obj with equivalence ≡ over Obj; (ii) we will write P
S
Σ
to denote the set of static parametrised
traces over ObjId i.e. PS
Σ
⊆ Σ∗ObjId with relations ≡ and ≡may.
In what follows, we assume that the static parametrised trace generator is an over-approximation of
the parametrised trace generator: PR
Σ
↓ Obj⊆ PS
Σ
⇓ObjId.
In our effort to reduce overheads by reducing a property, we will need to ensure that monitoring the
program by the created residual is enough, i.e. both the original property and the residual give the same
verdict for any given program trace, although their results may vary for other traces.
5Other analyses would be applicable in the case of parametrization by data instead of objects, and when this is not possible
all identifiers can be related by the may relation soundly
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Definition 2.6 (Equivalence). Two properties pi and pi ′ are said to be equivalent with respect to a set of
ground traces T , written pi ∼=T pi
′, if every trace in T is judged the same by either property: ∀t ∈ T · t ⊢
pi ⇐⇒ t ⊢ pi ′. This is lifted to parametrised and static parametrised traces, and sets thereof.
It is straightforward to prove that equivalence up to traces is an equivalence relation and is preserved
when reducing the set of traces, from which the next property holds.
Proposition 2.1. If pi ∼=T pi
′ and pi ′ ∼=T ′ pi
′′, then pi ∼=T∩T ′ pi
′′.
We can also show that equivalence with respect to the static parametrised trace generator can be
expressed in terms of its projection onto ground traces.
Proposition 2.2. pi ∼=PS
Σ
pi ′ ⇐⇒ pi ∼=PS
Σ
⇓ObjId pi
′.
As we have discussed, some parts of the program may be proved safe to unmonitor, upon which
we can silence these parts and transform the static parametrised trace generator by turning off certain
identifier-event pairs.
Definition 2.7. Given a static parametrised trace st, and a set of identifier-event pairs E ∈ 2ObjId×Σ, the
silencing of st by E , written, silence(st, ips), is defined to be the original trace st except for elements in
E:
silence(〈〉,E)
def
= 〈〉
silence((x,e) : st,E)
def
=
{
silence(st,E) if (x,e) ∈ E
(x,e) : silence(st,E) otherwise
We can also define equivalence between a program and its transformation (see [7]), however given
lack of space we focus solely on equivalence between residuals and the original property in this paper,
but define silencing since Clara
Based on the notions presented, we discuss the analysis techniques used in Clara [11], where each
of its analyses reduces the points in a program that activate the monitor at runtime. The only inputs
Clara needs is the source code of the program (which is then analysed using Soot [19]) and a property
automaton. The basic thesis of Clara is then that appropriate silencing of certain events, does not affect
satisfiability of the program with respect to the property but reduces the length of the traces to be analysed:
Given a static parametrised program P=PS
Σ
and property pi , the reduced program approximation obtained
through Clara, P′ = Clara(PS
Σ
,pi), is sound with respect to pi: P∼=pi P
′.
Clara uses three analysis techniques to reduce the program approximation [11]:
Quick Check. Some events specified by the property may not correspond to any method invocations
by the program, e.g. consider that given Figure 1, a program may only open streams and write to them,
but never read from them. Also, some events may only appear on loops in the same state, and therefore
never cause a change in state (e.g. lookAhead). Clara’s first analysis can be used to remove these kinds
of events from the property, and the corresponding transitions. This may lead to some states becoming
unreachable from the initial state, or states that cannot reach a bad state, and thus these can also be
removed. If a bad state cannot be reached from an initial state, then the property is satisfied.
Orphan Shadows Analysis. The first analysis ignores the fact that events are parametrised. Consider a
program where only open and lookAhead are ever called on one object, then by looking at the property
we can note that this object can never violate it (by performing the first analysis on this object, instead
of on the whole program), therefore both method calls can be silenced. This can then produce, for each
object, a set of such instrumentation points that can be disabled without affecting the result of monitoring.
Flow-Sensitive Nop-Shadows Analysis. The first two analyses do not take into account any of the
control-flow of the program, they just consider which methods are invoked or not but not in which order.
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q1start q2 q3 q4 q5
s1.write, s2.open s1.write, s2.opens1.write, s2.open
ε
s3.open s4.close s5.open s8.close
Figure 2: Example method CFG generalized to whole-method CFG.
This can be taken into account by considering a control-flow graph (CFG) of a program, which represents
a superset of its event-triggering behaviour, and silence any statements that, if present or not, do not affect
violation.
Through several over-approximations of a whole-program CFG and synchronous composition of
these with the property, Bodden et al. identify sequences of instrumentation points that only ever transi-
tion from and to the same state (taking into account parametrisation of the property), with no bad states in
between. Such points (which Bodden et al. call nop shadows) never have an effect on violation, meaning
they can be silenced, reducing the amount of times the monitor is triggered at runtime.
As an example, consider the synchronous composition of the property in Figure 1 and the approx-
imated CFG in Figure 2, and assume that all the object identifiers (si) associated with an event always
refer to the same event. One can then note that after q1, the synchronous composition is either in qa or
qc; then taking q1
s3.open
−−−−→ q2 will lead to qb, and then q2
s4.close−−−−→ q3
s5.open
−−−−→ q4 will necessarily lead to qb.
Since, then, these two transitions do not affect the control-flow, they can be disabled such that they do not
activate the monitor at runtime. Note the loops at state q4 represent the flattened behaviour of a method
called at that state, while those at q1 and q5, the behaviour outside the method.
3 Control-Flow Residual Analysis of DATEs
The properties considered by Clara are automata with explicit state. However, some properties require
a richer specification language — an extension to automata to deal with more expressive properties,
are DATEs [12]. One way in which DATEs extend finite state automata is through the introduction of a
symbolic state which can be checked and updated on transitions which trigger on events, with conditional
guards, and perform side-effect actions affecting the symbolic monitoring state.6
Consider the DATE shown in Figure 3. Transitions are labelled by a triple e | c 7→ a—when event e
occurs and if condition c holds, the transition is taken, executing action a7. For instance, the top transition
between states q0 and q1 triggers when a user is whitelisted and the monitoring variable transferCount is
at least 3, and if taken resets this variable. Applying Clara’s first analysis to this property by ignoring the
conditions and actions would result in removing the transfer transition in state q1 since upon a transfer
the monitor would never change states. Clearly, taking this transition could have an effect on which future
transitions are activated. For similar reasons, Clara’s third analysis may disable transitions unsoundly.
3.1 Preliminaries
We start by identifying what we mean by a DATE in this paper, and continue exploring some notions and
results we will need to present our residual analysis.
6DATEs also include other extensions which we do not deal with in this paper, such as timers and communication channels.
For full semantics of DATEs, refer to [12, 2].
7We leave out the bar and arrow when the condition is true or the action is skip (the identity action).
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Initial Variable State: transferCount = 0;
q0For Each: User u q1 q3
q4q5q2
greyList(u)
whiteList(u) 7→ transferCount = 0
transfer(u)
7→ transferCount++
whiteList(u) | transferCount ≥ 3
7→ transferCount = 0;
whiteList(u)
| transferCount < 3;
permanentlyDisabled(u)permanentlyDisabled(u)
∗∗
Figure 3: Example DATE specifying that once a user is greylisted they can only be whitelisted after performing
three or more transfers.
Definition 3.1. A DATE D is a tuple 〈Q,Σ,Θ,q0,θ0,B,δ 〉, where Q is the set of states, Σ is an alphabet
of events, Θ is the type of monitoring variable states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, θ0 : Θ is the initial
monitoring variable state, B⊆Q is a set of bad states, and δ ⊆ Q×Σ×C×A×Q is a transition relation
with conditions (C = Θ → B) and actions (A = Θ →Θ). We write q
e|c7→a
−−−→ q′ for (q,e,c,a,q′) ∈ δ , skip
for the identity action, and denote the type of DATEs by D.
Property automata as defined in Section 2 can be seen as instances of DATEs with a transition q
e
−→
q′ being translated into q
e|true 7→ skip
−−−−−−−→ q′. In our experience with DATEs, the number of states used is
typically rather small, and while the symbolic state can be unbounded (e.g. includes lists), in practice
such usage is rare and is usually delegated to a database.
We assume determinism of the transitions: from each state, transitions with the same events have
mutually exclusive conditions, with regards to any monitoring variable state. Thanks to this assumption,
we can use the transition function in an applicative manner.
Definition 3.2. The concrete transition function of a DATE δ ∈ (Q×Θ)×Σ → Q×Θ is defined over
the DATE and monitoring variable state:
δ ((q,θ ),e)
def
=
{
(q′,a(θ )) if q
e|c7→a
−−−→ q′∧ c(θ )
(q,θ ) otherwise
We will write δ ∗ to denote the transitive closure of δ .
This definition makes the DATEs semantics implicitly total with regards to events and conditions,
since if there is no transition for a certain event we remain at the same state.
Transitioning thus depends on the symbolic state, which we could approximate statically through
some kind of code or predicate analysis. However here we shall take the maximal over-approximation, by
always considering that a transition’s condition may both be true or false. More precise approximations
can be relatively more expensive to compute than than this, which is why we made the decision to focus
solely on control-flow analysis, leaving the use of predicate analysis for future work. This means that we
must consider transitioning into multiple states, which we cater for in the following definition.
Definition 3.3. Given states q,q′ ∈ Q and event e ∈ Σ, we say that q potentially goes to q′ with event e,
written q
e
−→approx q
′, if a transition with event e and a condition that can be satisfied, or q′ is q and there
is no outgoing transition out of it that must be taken on e being triggered:
q
e
−→approx q
′ def= (q
e|c7→a
−−−→ q′∧ c 6= false)∨ (q= q′∧ 6 ∃q′′ ·q′′ 6= q∧q
e|true7→a
−−−−−→ q′′)
Given a DATE, the static transition function ∆D ∈ 2
Q×Σ → 2Q is defined to be the function which,
given a set of states and an event, returns the set of states potentially reachable from any of the input
states: ∆D(S,e)
def
= {q′ | ∃q ∈ S ·q
e
−→approx q
′}.
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We use ∆∗D ∈ 2
Q×Σ∗→ 2Q to denote its transitive closure . Finally, we use q →֒D q
′ to denote that
q′ is reachable from q with the static transition relation: q →֒D q
′ def= ∃t ·q′ ∈ ∆∗D({q}, t).
We can prove that given a state and a ground trace, then the state reached by δ ∗ is also possibly reached
(with ∆∗) from that state, with that trace, i.e. ∆∗ over-approximates δ ∗.
Theorem 3.1. ∀θ : Θ, t : Σ∗,q ∈ Q · ∃θ ′ : Θ ·δ ∗((q,θ ′), t) = (q′,θ ) =⇒ q′ ∈ ∆∗({q}, t).
As we did for property automata, we define what it means for a DATE to satisfy the different kinds
of traces using this static approximation of transitioning at runtime, and relate it to the static transition
function.
Definition 3.4. A ground trace t ∈ Σ∗ is said to satisfy a DATE D (with Σ ⊆ ΣD), if none of its prefixes
applied to the transitive closure ofD, starting from the initial state ofD and the initial monitoring variable
state, lead to a bad state of D: t ⊢ D
def
= ∀t ′ ∈ prefixes(t) ·δ ∗((q0,θ0), t
′) = (q,θ)∧q 6∈ BD.
We define the satisfaction of a parametrised trace and a statically parametrised trace as before with
respect to a DATE and over this ground trace satisfaction operator, and similarly for the equivalence
relations between DATEs.
Base on the previous theorem, we can show satisfaction of a trace by considering whether any of its
prefixes possibly lead to a bad state.
Theorem 3.2. If the static transition function applied to any prefix of t from the start state of D does not
contain a bad state, then t satisfies D: (0∀t ∈ Σ∗ · ∀t ′ ∈ prefixes(t) ·∆({q0}, t)∩BD 6= /0) =⇒ t ⊢ D.
Moving on to creating residuals, from Figure 3 we can see that not all states are useful: consider
how being at q2, q4 and q5 implies that one can no longer violate the property. q5 can however only be
reached through q2 or q4 where the monitor verdict is clear, and thus q5 is useless. Thus we should keep
states q2 and q4 (since before reaching them we do not know the verdict of the trace), but we do not need
q5 (since satisfaction is clear). We then classify a state as useful if: (1) it is reachable from the initial
state, and it can reach a bad state (q1), or (2) it is reachable by one step from a state of the first kind (q2
and q4).
Definition 3.5. A state q in DATED is said to possibly lead to a violation in D, written badAfter(q), if it is
reachable from the initial state and a bad state is reachable from it: badAfter(q)
def
= q0 →֒ q∧∃q
′ ∈ B ·q →֒ q′.
A state q in DATED is said to be an entry-point to a satisfied region in D, written goodEntryPoint(q),
if it cannot possibly lead to a violation and is one transition away from such a state that can possibly lead
to a violation: goodEntryPoint(q)
def
= ¬badAfter(q)∧∃q′ ·q′
e
−→approx q∧badAfter(q
′).
A state q in DATE D is said to be useful in D, written useful(q), if it can possibly lead to a violation
or is an entry-point to a satisfied region in D: useful(q)
def
= badAfter(q)∨goodEntryPoint(q). Given a DATE
D, it can be reduced to the reachable useful states to obtain R(D) which contains only states in D which
are useful, and the transitions between them: δR(D)
def
= {(q,e,c,a,q′) ∈ δ | useful(q)∧useful(q′)}.
We can then show that a DATE reduced for reachability is equivalent to the original DATE with
respect to an approximation of a program, by using the theorems and propositions presented in the
previous sections, which we claim also apply to DATEs by simply using the DATE satisfaction operators.
Theorem 3.3. A DATE D is equivalent to its reachability-reduced counterpart R(D) (with alphabet Σ),
with respect to any set of traces: ∀T ⊆ Σ∗ ·D∼=T R(D).
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3.2 Residual Analysis
We are concerned with producing residuals of a DATE [6] with respect to some known information about
the program — the part of the property which cannot be proved from what we know about the program.
Recall that previously we informally characterized a residual D′ of a DATE D, given a static program
PS
Σ
over that same alphabet, by one property: the intersection of the program intersected with that of
property and separately with the residual are equal: where L(D) is the set of bad traces accepted by D,
L(D′)∩ (PS
Σ
⇓ ObjId) = L(D)∩ (PS
Σ
⇓ ObjId). This is equivalent to our notion of equivalence: D′ ∼=PS
Σ
D.
Note that the reachability-reduction just defined is a residual for all programs.
In this section, we start by presenting a number of definitions and results which we shall use to extend
the analysis used in Clara to create DATE residuals.
One of the ways we shall be creating residuals is by restricting the alphabet of a DATE, the result of
which is equivalent to the original DATE, with respect to some kind of traces.
Theorem 3.4. A DATE D with alphabet Σ and its alphabet-restriction by some alphabet Σ′ ⊆ Σ are
equivalent with respect to a set of ground traces T ⊆ Σ∗: D ↾ Σ(T )∼=T D
Since we are looking at parametrised traces, different objects in a program activate different instances
of the monitor. These objects may have different behaviour and thus they may use different subsets of
the DATE alphabet. We will thus, in the next section, consider the residuals of a DATE with respect
to different objects, however each of these residuals individually is not enough to monitor the whole
program soundly with. We define a union operator over DATEs to allow this.
To ensure that the combination of DATEs (D and D′) remains a DATE we require that they start from
the same initial state and monitoring state, and that a DATE exists that captures both of their behaviour:
∃D′′ : D ·QD∪QD′ ⊆ QD′′ ∧ΣD∪ΣD′ ⊆ ΣD′′ ∧BD∪BD′ ⊆ BD′′ ∧δD∪δD′ ⊆ δD′′ , i.e. D and D
′ are said to
be component-wise subsets of D′′.
Definition 3.6. Given two DATES that are component-wise subsets of another DATE8, their component-
wise union is defined as the property with both of their transitions, states and bad states, and starting
from the same initial state: D⊔D′
def
= {QD∪QD′ ,ΣD ∪ΣD′ ,q0,θ0,BD∪BD′ ,δD∪δD′}
We shall be producing residuals of a DATE by using the alphabet-restriction, then the reachability-
reduction, and then performing the union on all these residuals. The next theorem shows that this union
preserves the behaviour of the single reduced DATEs.
Theorem 3.5. Given sets of traces T0,T1 ⊆ Σ
∗, and DATE D, the union of D’s alphabet-restriction with
respect to each of the sets of traces is equivalent to D with respect to the union of the sets of traces:
R(D ↾ Σ(T0))⊔R(D ↾ Σ(T1))∼=T0∪T1 D.
We can now move on to presenting our constructions of residuals.
3.3 Residual Constructions
We start by formally describing analyses which both prune the property by removing transitions and
states that are irrelevant for the program’s violation, and silence statements that the analysis concludes
will not affect violation. We present three residuals, one without the events used by the program, another
taking into account whether events can occur on the same object, and the last one removing from the
DATE transitions that can never be used by a trace in the program. Theoretically, using the last analysis
8This ensures that the union, as defined here, is in turn merely the bigger DATE without some states and/or transitions,
which is still a DATE, since determinism is preserved.
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is enough, since each analysis is finer than the other, however in practice one may want to first use
the other analyses since they are cheaper to compute. We prove that each of these is equivalent to the
original DATE with respect to the given program. The last two analyses also provide the opportunity of
identifying statements in the program that can be silenced safely.
3.3.1 Absent event pruning
Recall that Clara’s first analysis computes the symbols that should be monitored, thus excluding: (i)
events that appeared only on transitions looping in the same state, (ii) symbols that do not appear in
the program, and (iii) symbols only outgoing from states from which a bad state is not reachable in the
property reduced by the previous types of symbols. We now consider these in the case of DATEs.
We cannot remove transitions such as in (i) since such idempotent transitions may perform actions
which affect the triggering of other transitions (consider the looping transition on state q3 in Figure 3).
Those of type (ii) can be removed safely, since if a certain symbol does not appear in the program,
then clearly transitions tagged by such symbols in the property will never be taken and can be removed.
While our reachability-reduction already takes care of events of type (iii)9. We thus define residual0 over
a property D, with respect to a program PS
Σ
: residual0(D)
def
= R(D ↾ Σ(PS
Σ
)).
Based on Thm. 3.3, Thm. 3.4, and Prop. 2.2, we can show that this is equivalent to the original
DATE with respect to the used program.
Theorem 3.6. The residual0 of a DATE D is equivalent to D, with respect to program approximation P
S
Σ
(with Σ⊆ Σresidual0(D)): residual0(D)
∼=PS
Σ
D
3.3.2 Object-specific absent event pruning
Like Clara, we can generalise the first analysis to consider events occurring on objects. Given an object, if
the traces corresponding to it do not use the full alphabet of the DATE, then we can create a residual that is
enough to monitor just that object soundly. Consider Figure 3, if we have an object that we know is never
greylisted but performs transfers then we can keep only the transitions triggered upon a transfer. Based on
the results given in Thm. 3.3 and Thm. 3.4, we define this as: residual1(D,objId)
def
= R(D ↾ Σ(PS
Σ
⇓ objId)).
Proposition 3.1. The residual1, for an identifier objId, is equivalent to the original DATED with respect
to the traces of objId in the program PS
Σ
: residual1(D,objId)∼=PS
Σ
⇓objId D.
For runtime monitoring we now have two choices: (1) create a different monitor for each object
identifier, corresponding to the associated residual, such that the monitor only instruments the statements
associated with the identifier; (2) perform the union on all the residual DATEs and instrument the program
as usual (i.e. by simply matching the DATE events with statements). The former would require new
instrumentation techniques that employ static aliasing knowledge, while with the latter one could use
existing techniques. Using Prop. 3.1, Prop. 3.5 and Prop. 2.2, we can show that the resulting DATE in
the second choice is still equivalent to the original one, with respect to the program.
Theorem 3.7. Given the residual for each identifier, then their union is equivalent to the original DATE,
with the program approximation:
⊔
objId∈ObjId residual1(D,objId)
∼=PS
Σ
D.
Consider again an object that only performs transfers. With respect to this, Figure 3 would be reduced
to just the initial state using the second residual, and thus we can statically conclude that the object
satisfies the property. In this manner, we no longer need to monitor this particular object when it performs
9Note that this would not be always safe if we were considering multiple DATEs executing at the same time.
S. Azzopardi, C. Colombo & G.J. Pace 39
a transfer, and thus any transfers associated solely with it can be silenced. Using an object-specific
residual, we can then reduce the traces in the static program by removing identifier-events pairs, where
the event does not appear in the identifier’s residual: noEffect((objId,e),D)
def
= e 6∈ Σresiduali(D,objId).
A static program without such pairs will remain equivalent to the original static program, with respect
to that residual (i.e. corresponding traces in the respective programs will maintain the same verdict with
respect to the residual)10.
3.3.3 Unusable transition pruning
In the previous two analyses we have ignored the flow of events, in fact we consider only the alphabet of
the program and DATE. Our novel third analysis, however, makes use of the control-flow, by considering
the possible traces of a program.
Consider Figure 3, and the trace whitelist;greylist; transfern as the program (over a single object).
Given the previous two analyses, only transitions between states q0, q1 and q3 would remain. However,
the whitelist transitions from q1 can never be activated since the trace only performs whitelist before the
user is greylisted. Thus we can remove these transitions. We define what it means for a trace to use a
transition.
Definition 3.7. A trace is said to use a transition from q to q′ with an event e, in a DATE D, if the
transitions condition is not false, and a strict prefix of the trace can potentially go to q and the head of
the remaining suffix is e: uses(t,q
e|c7→a
−−−→ q′)
def
= c 6= false∧∃t ′++ 〈e〉 ∈ prefixes(t) ·q ∈ ∆∗D({q0}, t
′)
In general, given a trace, this does not always trigger all the transitions in a DATE, in fact we can
prune away the unused transitions and the residual DATE will remain equivalent to the original one with
respect to that trace. We can generalise this notion by removing transitions that cannot be used by any of
the traces: residualP2 (D,P
S
Σ
)
def
= R(D ↾ {d ∈ δ | ∃t : PS
Σ
⇓ ObjId ·uses(t,d)}).11
Theorem 3.8. The residual2 is equivalent to the original DATE: residual2(D,P
S
Σ
)∼=PS
Σ
D
Previously we discussed informally that multiple CFGs that approximate the program’s behaviour
can be created, meaning we may have multiple over-approximations of a program, we can thus apply
the residual2 on each of these successively, creating a possibly finer residual than we can with one over-
approximation.
residual2(D,〈〉)
def
= D
residual2(D,P
S
Σ
: Ps)
def
= residual2(residual2(D,P
S
Σ
),Ps)
Theorem 3.9. Given a set of static program over-approximations, then applying the third residual con-
struction, consecutively, returns one which is equivalent to the original with respect to the intersection of
projection into ground traces of each approximation: residual2(D,Ps)∼=⋂0<i<length(Ps)Ps(i)⇓ObjIdi D12
Clara’s third analysis silenced statements in the program that together do not have any effect on
the flow with respect to the property. However, given conditions on transitions in DATEs, we do not
necessarily know if a transition will be activated or not. Hence, the static transition of a DATE ranges
10See [7] for a full formalisation of what this means, and a proof for that statement, which we have omitted from here, given
lack of space.
11Note that we can also define this for singular objects, residualP2 (D,P
S
Σ
,objId)
def
=R(D ↾ {d ∈ δ | ∃t : PS
Σ
⇓ objId ·uses(t,d)})
and perform the same noEffect analysis as with the previous residual.
12This is significant because the ground traces generated by static programs are always a subset of that generated by the
runtime program, ensuring that the intersection of the statically generated traces here is a subset of those at runtime.
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over a set of states, considering both possibilities of a transition being taken or not. Using the same
principle, we can apply Clara’s third analysis to method invocations that only trigger DATE transitions
without conditions (or rather with the true condition), and that do not have actions with side-effects.
However, we do not detail this here given space constraints.
4 Case Study
q0
Bronze
UserInfo
q1 q2
createdUser activate
activate
blacklist,greylist,whitelist
τ
q0
{Gold/Silver}
UserInfo
q1 q3
q4
q5
createdUser activate
activate
blacklist
whitelist
pay
τ
Figure 4: CFG lifted with respect to aliasing of each sub-type of UserInfo, with respect to the property in Figure 5.
These analysis techniques presented in this paper have been implemented in a tool13. It is worth
noting that due to the differences in the analysis techniques, our tool does not build directly on Clara,
although it uses the Soot [19] tool for Java program analysis. The tool was evaluated them on a simple
financial transaction system with users connecting to a proxy in order to enable communication with
a transaction server inspired by the industrial systems we have previously used runtime verification on
[8]. The proxy and the transaction server can be two different services (the client and provider), possibly
provided by different providers, with the property specifying the behaviour that the transaction server
expects out of the proxy.
In order to see how our approach scales with increased system load and monitoring overhead, the
system was evaluated with different numbers of users behaving in a controlled random manner, thus
allowing for repeatability of the experiment. The static analysis was performed three times: (1) with
the original property to produce the program monitored by the first residual; (2) with the first residual
to produce the program monitored by the second residual property, with some method calls silenced
according to the instrumentation point analysis previously defined; and (3) with the second residual to
produce the program monitored by the third residual. This is a one-time pre-deployment cost, and it was
found to take just a few seconds.
The system was verified with respect to a specification constraining payment patterns based on the
status of the user, e.g. a blacklisted user can only perform a payment if it has not exceeded a certain risk
threshold. The risk level of a user is calculated by the monitor by checking that the companies the users
deal with in general have transacted with users in good standing (i.e. that are not currently blacklisted
or greylisted), with the number of such users in bad standing having an effect on the risk level of the
user in question14 . This part of the specification is shown in Figure 5, while Figure 4 illustrates the
property-relevant behaviour of each possible user object, representing the system under analysis.
The memory used and execution time of the unmonitored program was compared to that of the moni-
tored one, and to that of optimised monitors with the three analyses applied cumulatively. The experiment
was run for different numbers of users, with three sample executions used to normalise differences be-
tween measurements. Given that the monitors used in the experiment do not have state to keep track
13The tool can be downloaded from https://github.com/shaunazzopardi/clarva.
14Note that caching such a calculation does not aid the monitor performance since the risk level changes with each transaction
— also those not involving the user in question.
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qaFor each: UserInfo u qb
qc
qd
qe q f
qg qh
createdUser(u)
activate(u,success)
| success
pay(u)
blacklist(u)
| risk(u) > 0.5
blacklist(u)
| risk(u) ≤ 0.5
pay(u)
transfer(u)
whitelist(u)
whitelist(u)
pay(u,dest)
| ¬dest.whitelisted
transfer(u)
blacklist(u)
| risk(u) > 0.5
blacklist(u)
| risk(u) ≤ 0.5
Figure 5: Property, with dashed transitions removed by the first analysis, and dotted by the third.
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1st
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2nd
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3rd
1000 206s 371s 369s 295s 225s
1050 231s 456s 445s 342s 235s
1100 24s 450s 452s 314s 251s
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1200 268s 570s 562s 380s 280s
1250 309s 576s 556s 413s 316s
1300 316s 642s 657s 440s 330s
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Overheads
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Figure 6: Table and plot of the experiment results.
of, no measurable memory overheads were found any of the experiment runs. However, as expected,
monitoring induced considerable processing overheads (see Figure 6), which were substantially reduced
using our optimisations from an average of 97% to just 4%.
The first analysis took roughly the same time as the monitored time, since it only removed transi-
tions that could never be taken, resulting in the monitoring engine only bypassing a conditional check
for the never-activated event (since transfer does not appear in Figure 4). The second analysis did not
reduce the property itself, but turned off monitoring of all statements in the program associated only
with bronze users, avoiding monitors being created at runtime which are never violated (consider that
in Figure 4 bronze users cannot effect payments). The third analysis identified that blacklisted users are
never allowed to affect a payment by the application (i.e. the program never makes it to q f and qh in
Figure 5, consider the parallel composition of the CFGs and the property) and thus simply made sure
that non-activated users do not affect payments (i.e. once a user was created, the monitor transitioned to
qb and checked every incoming event against the only remaining outgoing transitions to qc and qd). This
resulted in an insignificant level of overheads, given the monitoring engine only had to check against two
transitions (while in state qc), without any expensive conditions to check and no tight-looping.
Similar to the results from [11], the gains arise since the system does not necessarily use all the events
appearing in the property and some of the correctness logic is encoded directly in the control-flow of the
system. In our client-provider scenario: (i) the client does not make use of all the functions the provider
allows (at least not for every possible object); and (ii) the client is coded in such a way that allows
reasoning about its control-flow e.g. blacklisting a user directly by setting a flag. In practice, we envisage
that this approach is applicable, for instance, when encoding properties over APIs or constraining server-
access, allowing for monitoring overhead reduction for API clients or clients accessing the server.
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5 Related Work
Our work builds directly on the results of Bodden et al. [11], but there are many other instances of the
use of static analysis in order to optimise dynamic analysis. In [6], we previously presented a high-level
theory of residuals, and a model-based approach to combining static and dynamic analysis, and gave
informal examples of how residuals of DATEs could be computed. In this paper we present formally this
intuition.
Dwyer et al. [13] take a different approach from ours or Clara’s, wherein they identify safe regions
in a program, i.e. sequences of statements that cannot violate a property, and if they are deterministic
with respect to a property (if the monitor enters the region at a state q then it always exists at the same
state q′). The effect of the region on the monitor is then replaced by a new unique event e, and the
property augmented by a transition from q to q′ with e. Note, that this summarises the effect of some
instrumentation into one, wherein we simply remove instrumentation that does not affect violation. Jin
et al. [14] also investigate parametric properties, and investigate optimisations which can be made to the
implementation of monitoring logics at runtime, namely more efficient garbage collection of monitors
associated with an object that has been garbage collected. It is worth noting how our second analysis
may prevent some of this behaviour by detecting statically that an object may never violate and instead
prevent the creation of its monitor. Other approaches try to make runtime overheads more predictable
and manageable, but lose certainty of the verdict. [18] is an example of event sampling, where not all
events generated by a program are processed by the program, where this approach uses a statistical model
to approximate the gaps in the execution trace. [9] extends this approach to reduce the memory and time
overheads incurred by statistical calculations performed at runtime, by estimating them statically.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Through this work, we have extended a static optimisation for the monitoring of parametric properties,
to deal with automata with symbolic state. We reduce both the property using the system, and the system
instrumentation by using the property. This static analysis is based on the control-flow of the program,
and an aliasing relationship between relevant objects of the program, which we illustrated through a case
study emulating a payment transaction system. These residual analyses have been implemented in a tool
which we are currently preparing to make publicly available, this tool can be used to pre-process DATEs
before they are used to monitor a program. We are in the process of combining these results with those
of StaRVOOrS [3], where in contrast to our approach, StaRVOOrS, static analysis is used to reduce the
data-flow aspect of the specification (using pre- and post-conditions), leaving the control-flow aspect (in
the form of DATEs) for dynamic analysis. Our work is complementary to this approach, and in fact we
are currently investigating how to optimise properties using both control and data flow static analysis.
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